Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Risks, cilt.14, sa.2, 2026 (ESCI, Scopus)
This study models the auditor–client relationship as a strategic game shaped by two-sided information asymmetry and examines how this structure influences key audit outcomes, namely audit delay and audit fees, in Türkiye. Using a game-theoretic framework complemented by empirical analysis, the study analyzes independent audit reports dated 31 December 2024 for 201 Borsa Istanbul firms audited by Big Four auditors. Two ordinary least squares models are estimated: one for audit delay and one for the logarithm of audit fees. The findings indicate that firm size and effort-related cost proxies play a central role in explaining audit fees, reflecting scale-related audit complexity. Financial risk, while not significantly associated with audit fees, is found to be negatively related to audit delay, suggesting that riskier firms may accelerate the reporting process through stronger monitoring, earlier planning, or tighter regulatory scrutiny. Audit opinion, by contrast, does not exhibit a statistically meaningful association with reporting delay, likely due to limited variation within the sample. Overall, the results partially support the risk–effort–cost mechanism proposed by the game-theoretic framework and highlight how institutional features of the Turkish audit market shape the relationship between risk and reporting timeliness. The study contributes to the literature by framing the audit process as a strategic decision environment and by providing updated evidence from an emerging market context.